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Cold War: a Transnational Approach to a
Global Heritage
By JOHN SCHOFIELD, WAYNE COCROFT and MARINA DOBRONOVSKAYA
SUMMARY: Although within living memory, many countries now consider their surviving Cold
War architecture as part of their heritage. It can even be a priority for heritage managers given
that significant buildings are often suitable for reuse while extensive ‘brownfield’ sites such as
airfields can be used for large-scale redevelopment. In a number of countries whose work we
refer to here (notably the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe), agencies responsible for
managing their country’s heritage have approached this priority by creating national inventories
of sites and buildings with a view to taking informed decisions on their future. This paper
presents the argument that the wider international context of the Cold War provides a more
appropriate (or additional, higher-level) framework for such decision making. Such a
‘transnational’ approach would allow the comparison of similar (e.g. European) sites not merely
within national borders but across the full extent of their western NATO1 deployment in Europe
and North America. Taking this approach would also allow comparison with related sites in
countries that formed part of the eastern-bloc Warsaw Pact.2 After outlining some examples of
how national agencies have approached their Cold War heritage, this paper presents the four
stages of this transnational approach making provision for an improved understanding and man-
agement of Cold War heritage sites wherever they occur. With a specific focus on the direct
comparison between England and Russia, and also referring to sites surviving elsewhere within
the former NATO and Warsaw Pact regions, as well as the United States, we argue that this
four-stage approach: provides new understandings of a complex archaeological and architectural
record; gives fresh perspectives on significance; and (importantly in a time of geopolitical
instability) does so in a spirit of cooperation and friendship.
INTRODUCTION
The surviving heritage of the Cold War period3
presents a challenging contradiction: on the one hand
an historic era, increasingly presented in history
books as though it is a ‘distant’ past; yet on the other
hand a resilient, unforgotten and therefore enduring
present that remains both physically within the land-
scape and psychologically in the memories of most
people over 40 years old. Cold War legacies continue
to form, as people are reminded of the period through
ever-popular fiction, film, television programmes, art
and music, or through the re-use or re-design of for-
mer military Cold War-era buildings.4
Building on work originally undertaken in
England by English Heritage (and discussed below),5
authors from England and Russia here combine for
the first time to explore Cold War cultural heritage
not from particular and distinct political and geo-
graphical standpoints, but from a broader
‘transnational’ perspective. Built around ideas pro-
moted by Hannerz,6 and not least his thinking on bor-
ders and frontiers and the benefits of enabling
information and ideas to flow across them, our
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argument is that in a globalised world (one that argu-
ably emerged during the Cold War period), national
understandings of culture are limiting and that per-
spectives which effectively cross boundaries and
enable a broader perspective provide a better way to
achieve global perspective. What this approach
should not imply, however, is a rigid top-down global
management model reminiscent of the highly struc-
tured regime of the World Heritage Convention.
Rather, one might suggest as a parallel the transition
that Willems’7 has identified, from state-based frame-
works that originate in a ‘European way of thinking’
(being the current approach to Cold War alongside
all other forms of national heritage) towards a regime
led by increasingly influential organisations to guide
their own global operations. This approach is sum-
marised in one such company’s heritage guidelines,
noting how it respects and protects cultural heritage
because, ‘it is the right thing to do and because there
is a strong business case for doing so’,8 while
actively seeking the empowerment of local commun-
ities as stewards and caretakers, replacing the more
traditional idea of heritage experts.9 Within this
framework, and in ways reminiscent of Ingold’s10
notion of ‘taskscape’ (defined below), we therefore
present the idea of a single transnational Cold War
landscape (comprising East and West), rather than
either many (one per state) or two (East vs. West).
The reality is of a relict transnational militarised
landscape comprising a diverse range of sites and
monuments, either buried, lost to redevelopment or
remaining as architectural forms, that in Ingold’s
terms fall within (but are not confined to) categories
including controlled mobility, geopolitical habitat, a
military-industrial economy, the ecology of militar-
ised landscape, and public space, for display and
commemoration. Such a transnational approach, we
argue, offers a more holistic, symmetrical, humane,
democratic and intellectually rewarding way to
address a heritage of the recent and remembered past.
At its core, the paper proposes a transnational
four-stage approach to managing these Cold War
sites. Adopting a grounded approach (through which
data is used to develop theory as opposed to having
theory to test data),11 the four stages are: (1) charac-
terisation and inventory, (2) creating an overarching
framework, (3) values-based assessment, and (4)
decision-making. Having worked through this four-
stage approach, we conclude that by adopting this
approach and considering the significant cultural and
ideological differences between East and West, the
Cold War militarised landscape shows remarkably
little variation in form.
For this paper, Cold War sites are defined as those
structures, buildings and areas used for a military
purpose during the Cold War period. Many such sites
were built during this period while earlier military
sites were either repurposed or enhanced by add-
itional construction. Some of these sites constitute
the operational ‘teeth’ (in military parlance) of mili-
tary activity during this period, such as missile launch
sites; and others the ‘tail’, being support facilities or
infrastructure. An obvious and significant example of
the latter includes the many research and develop-
ment sites that were so influential and important to
Cold War military strategy and operations.
REMEMBERING THE COLD WAR
The Cold War was a political stand-off between the
capitalist West and the communist East which, in the
northern hemisphere at least, lasted from the end of
the Second World War until the break-up of the
Soviet Union. It was a global phenomenon which
involved most countries to some degree, including
those which were neutral. While the development of
military technology during the Cold War was mostly
confined to the northern hemisphere, many parts of
the southern hemisphere were also implicated by pol-
itical association or through trade agreements and the
supply of raw materials. The Cold War was also
highly localised in its impact on communities, most
infamously at the border which divided East from
West and which became (and remains) the symbol of
the Cold War: the Berlin Wall12 and the wider Iron
Curtain of which it formed a part.13 This border
cemented political and ideological division in the
landscape, while dividing communities and fami-
lies.14 In Berlin this was an impact that continues to
shape social relations within the modern city, over
thirty years later.
The Cold War period also witnessed significant
technological and scientific progress which had a
transformative impact on the militarised landscape.
For example, new jet aircraft required longer, hard-
ened runways and reinforced or ‘hardened’ structures
for their protection, while a global defence landscape
(notably using radar) emerged to counter the threat of
increasingly effective and longer-range weapons sys-
tems. There was also an impact on domestic architec-
ture. In the United States, for example, the Federal
Civil Defense Administration advised householders
to prepare for Armageddon. Yet in Las Vegas, close
to the Nevada (atomic weapons) Test Site, in a move
to ‘neutralise fear’, domestic design countered this
advice, with large plate glass windows proving a
popular design feature in spite of their obvious draw-
backs in the event of missile attack.15
Heritage decision-making relies on a good under-
standing of what survives (often referred to as ‘the
resource’); the better we understand this resource, the
more informed our decisions will be about it. Being
so recent, we might assume a plentiful supply of
detailed primary source materials to build such an
understanding. But usually for reasons of national
security, in the United Kingdom and in other coun-
tries, these primary sources are elusive: archives and
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documents often remain classified, while oral testi-
monies are hard to source and labour intensive to col-
lect. More prosaically, at the time of a military unit’s
withdrawal from a site or country, or a site’s aban-
donment, the historical significance of site drawings
and documentation related to these individual sites
may not be recognized, with their retention represent-
ing an unwelcome and on-going cost. Much of this
material is therefore destroyed. Personal testimonies
are usually problematic as it is often difficult to track
those who once occupied former military sites,
although this is becoming easier through veterans’
social media networks. One exception to this lack of
primary research material are the transnational gov-
ernmental studies undertaken to support, for example,
the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in
December 1987. These studies identified precise
locations for all sites covered by the Treaty16 thus
providing an important source of information for
some site types, and a blueprint of sorts for the trans-
national approach suggested here.
When heritage-based research on the Cold War
was initiated in a number of countries in the early to
mid-1990s, the locations, chronology, and types of
military sites were therefore imperfectly understood
for the reasons outlined above. This was also the
time at which sites were under the greatest threat of
demolition, so research was urgently needed if appro-
priate management strategies were to be implemented
before the sites were sold and either lost without
record or irrevocably damaged. The approach in most
countries where research was undertaken aligns with
Stage 1 of the Methodology (below): characterization
and inventory. Here, however, we argue that Stage 1
is merely the first stage in a longer research process
and that, learning from our experience in the United
Kingdom, all stages are best undertaken within the
transnational frame of reference.
Prior to discussing the methodology, questions
remain on how the Cold War should be remembered,
and on the value or cultural significance of its mater-
ial legacies. Opinions and priorities vary between
countries, not least in relation to the post-colonial
concept of ‘orphan heritage’ that survives where
forces were stationed on the territory of once allied
nations.17 A particular set of motivations and values
might be argued where sites exist in the country they
were originally intended to defend. But where the
political landscape has changed, and the sites now
exist beyond their original political boundary, a very
different set of priorities will likely prevail. Virilio18
describes this situation in post Second World War
France, where even in the 1980s, German fortifica-
tions of its Atlantic Wall were being demolished by
local communities, to help erase painful memories.
Second World War airfields in Britain were at the
same time given very different treatment, with statu-
tory protection often afforded to sites representing a
heroic heritage of defence and victory.
Within the former Soviet Union and previously
allied countries, military museums were opened dur-
ing the Cold War and included material from the
‘current’ conflict within their collections.19 The
museums generally focussed on collecting military
vehicles, aircraft, missiles, munitions, documents and
photographs. Yet in Russia at least, most Cold War
sites are neglected, and quickly deteriorating.20
Unlike the collections, sites are not considered cul-
tural heritage and certainly not a heritage warranting
protection. In Russia, there are no Cold War sites
under state or local authority control or that are man-
aged as monuments, although some, such as Bunker
42 (at Taganka, Moscow), are under private manage-
ment. Beyond Russia, many former Cold War mili-
tary sites are scattered across the former Soviet
republics. While few of these former Soviet sites are
afforded protection, there are some exceptions. At
Plokstin_e, within the Zemaitija National Park
(Lithuania), for example, a partly dismantled Soviet
SS-4 medium range missile base has been opened
to tourists.21
In the United Kingdom and the United States, sig-
nificant research has been undertaken on Cold War
sites at national level and for specific cultural
resource management purposes. In England, a com-
prehensive study of the Cold War has provided a
framework for the statutory protection of key sites.
This work, by English Heritage, included detailed
survey for each of a variety of site types22 alongside
a broader study to specifically determine their
national significance.23 Denmark’s national agency
has similarly produced an inventory of its Cold War
heritage and used it to inform decisions on the pro-
tection of sites.24 Similarly, researchers in Italy and
Albania, have begun to document the countries’ Cold
War heritage.25 Elsewhere, sites are managed by
authorities at a regional or state level. An inventory
of Cold War military barriers and borders was cre-
ated in Bavaria in 2003, for instance, with five loca-
tions protected as a result.26 More recently the
Rhineland Regional Council researched all of the
20th-century military sites in its area.27 In Berlin,
traces of the iconic Berlin Wall have been docu-
mented.28 In the Czech Republic archaeologists are
beginning to explore former border areas behind the
Iron Curtain.29 In the United States, the Historic
American Engineering Record, the Desert Research
Institute, Las Vegas, and others have been active in
documenting individual sites.30 In Canada, historians
have researched aspects of the country’s Cold War
experience.31
As stated above, these studies shape an under-
standing of Cold War infrastructure in individual
regions and countries and can provide a robust frame-
work for heritage decision making in those countries.
What they do not provide is any appreciation of the
wider geopolitical landscape of which these sites
formed a part. The following sections will present
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such an approach (summarised in Table 1) that builds
on these foundations, emphasising the benefits of
transnational cooperation in the earlier two stages of
the four-stage process alongside the need for a feed-
back loop in which characterisation/inventory and the
framework inform one another as research is under-
taken and understanding develops. This transnational
cooperation extends to the third stage with its need
for some degree of consensus, while a more nuanced
and inevitably locally-led approach to decision mak-
ing will exist at Stage 4.
MANAGING COLD WAR LEGACIES: A
FOUR-STAGE
‘TRANSNATIONAL’ APPROACH
STAGE 1 - CHARACTERISATION
AND INVENTORY
Characterisation and inventory take account of the
function, architecture and design of individual
sites. This is achieved by research combining any
available historical documentation with aerial pho-
tographs and satellite imagery, survey records and
fieldwork to create a typology of sites. Once this
typology exists, newly discovered sites can be
placed within it, ensuring that it is flexible
enough to accommodate new forms that had pre-
viously passed unrecognised and that it can be
adjusted as understanding develops. As we discuss
below, with a transnational approach similar site
types can be compared between and across coun-
tries and alliances.
While one might expect significant regional varia-
tions in architecture across the Cold War’s political
divide, for example reflecting technological and eco-
nomic diversity, work undertaken so far and pre-
sented here is suggestive of a more universal Cold
War heritage. Building on the inventory and survey
work undertaken to date (as stated above, focused on
the work undertaken in the United States, United
Kingdom and Russia), Table 2 provides such a trans-
national typological framework. As noted previously,
this framework is not fixed and will continue to
evolve as new information informs new
understandings.
A first impression from Table 2 is of compatibil-
ity. Terms vary, alongside technologies, yet the
framework and main categories and groups are com-
monly held. In short, the broad ‘high level’ frame-
work holds true for East and West. Perhaps this is
unsurprising, as the situation (broadly speaking) was
the same for everyone. In the geopolitical maelstrom
of the Cold War, every country directly involved
needed both defence measures and the means to
attack. The key players were also vying with each
other for technological and political advantage, each
engaged in industrial espionage, and each wanted to
be the first to conquer space. However, beyond the
‘headline’ Categories and Groups (and Classes to
some degree), more detailed morphological and typo-
logical ordering reveals distinctive national styles as
well as the alliances (e.g. across either NATO or
Warsaw Pact countries) cemented by technological
transfers. An example is nuclear deployment sites
(Figure 2). Superficially the contemporary launch
sites of Soviet SS-4 Sandal missiles and United
States Thor missiles of the 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis bore many similarities.32 Due to their relatively
limited range and the need for rapid deployment,
both were built on the soil of allied states using
imported prefabricated components on unprotected
pre-surveyed fixed launch sites with associated war-
head stores, storage areas for liquid fuels, and con-
trol centres.
A generation later in the late 1970s and early
1980s Soviet missiles increasingly relied on mobile
systems with protected shelters, launch vehicles, and
warheads. In the United Kingdom, United States
cruise missiles were stored in protected shelters at
Greenham Common (Berkshire, Figure 2) and
Molesworth (Cambridgeshire), with the intention that
TABLE 1
Four-stage approach to managing Cold War heritage sites
Stage of process Result Application
1. Characterisation and inventory Definition of Categories, Groups,
Classes, Types etc
Transnational




3. Values-based assessment Determining the value and
significance of surviving sites
Transnational
4. Decision-making Determining the ‘heritage future’
(the purpose/use) of
surviving sites
National, regional or local
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TABLE 2
Characterisation and Inventory of Military and Associated Material Culture/Architecture (Ticks indicate
presence, and crosses likely absence)
Category, Group, Class United Kingdom Soviet Union
Air Defence
1 Early Warning Systems - Radar





Improved UK Air Defence
Environment – late 1980s
Tall King P-14 Early Warning
Radar 1950s
2 Aircraft and nuclear attack






3 Anti-Aircraft Gun Sites





Permanent 3.7-inch and 5.25-
inch sites -until 1955
Anti-Aircraft Operations
Rooms c.1951-55
4 Surface to Air Missiles
Class – separate by phase,
recognised by distinctive
layouts and buildings
Surface to Air Missile
Command Centres
Bloodhound Mark I – 1958-64
Bloodhound Mark II – 1963-91
Tactical Control Centres
1958-64
SA1 Guild – 1950s
SA2 – Guideline – 1960s
SA3 – Goa -1960s
SA5 – Gammon – 1960s
B200 Radar bunker, YO-YO,
Moscow air defences 1950s
5 Fighter Interceptor Airfields 
6 Anti-Ballistic Missile Ballistic Missile Early Warning
System - Fylindales
Dog House ABM Radar
Cat House ABM Radar
Hen House ABM Radar
Galosh ABM Missile
Nuclear Deterrent
7 Command Centres  For example, Bunker 42, Moscow
8 Bomber Airfields
Strategic / tactical RAF V-Bomber
US Strategic Air Command
USAF
9 Nuclear Weapons Stores Separate central RAF stores –
c.1953-61
Royal Navy 1968
10 Nuclear Missile Deployment
Sites




















they would be deployed on mobile launch vehicles.33
Alongside these obvious similarities, a notable differ-
ence is that missile deployment within the Warsaw
Pact included the provision of separate nuclear war-
head stores controlled by elite KGB and airborne
troops (Figure 2). Such provision did not exist within
NATO. The Soviet infrastructure also included mis-
sile train depots, for which there is no obvious west-
ern comparison.
Related to missile deployment was radar. The
Warsaw Pact placed greater emphasis on mobile
radar systems than was the case in NATO, meaning
that there are fewer archaeological traces in Russia
than exist for the NATO’s fixed systems.34 As men-
tioned earlier, most sites of this type were mapped as
part of the verification of the Intermediate Nuclear




Category, Group, Class United Kingdom Soviet Union
Ground Forces
12 Barracks


























20 Defence Manufacturing Sites





Class – separate by phase/
distinctive buildings War
Rooms





23 Civil Defence Structures  Network of civil nuclear shelters
24 The Utilities  
25 Public Nuclear Shelters
26 Private Nuclear Shelters





























34 Coastal defences Guns until 1956 Guns and shore to ship missiles
35 Border surveillance X 
Miscellaneous
36 The Peace Movement Peace camps X
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Another difference between East and West would
appear to have been anti-nuclear protest, although it
is possible that information about this in the Soviet
Union was and remains restricted. But from what we
know it would appear there were few significant
spontaneous, citizen-led anti-nuclear protest move-
ments in Warsaw Pact countries, whereas it was
strongly evident in the West. Obvious and well-
known examples of the physical manifestations of
western anti-nuclear protests exist for example
around the periphery of the former military base at
Greenham Common,36 and at the entrance to the
Nevada Test Site in the American Midwest.37
In summary, and in the broadest sense, the
‘characterisation and inventory’ stage of the process
shows sites displaying more similarity than difference,
usually with technology at the core. These similarities
are most evident at the higher level
(Category>Group>Class, eg. Air Defence>Early
Warning System>Radar); local variations tend to
emerge more clearly beyond this, in Types, Sub-types
etc. Overall, the Cold War involved two ‘sides’ that
were ideologically and culturally distinct, yet both had
comparable ambition and the resources with which to
attain it. Considering the differences involved, the land-
scape of the Cold War appears to show remarkably lit-
tle variation. Using a transnational approach, this
observation could prove helpful in both the assessment
of sites and in deciding on their future management.
STAGE 2 - BUILDING A FRAMEWORK
With the information available from Stage 1, a
framework can be constructed around two central
factors: chronology and technological development.
These two factors are of course closely related. We
begin with chronology.
Chronology
For a transnational approach to Cold War heritage, it
is important to recognise and accommodate the possi-
bility that architecture followed different trajectories
in different countries, for example in relation to rapid
changes in technology or threat level. It is also
important to identify the possibility of similarities.
As we have seen, within and between the two major
alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) there is both
marked variation but also close similarity in architec-
ture, and its development.
From the perspective of the United States, and
based on the ‘Stage 1’ work undertaken to date,
Hanson38 has identified three principal building phases
of the Cold War, which he has categorized as follows:
 Evolution - Early Cold War 1945–1957
 Revolution - Middle Cold War 1958–1975
 Resolution - Late Cold War 1976–1989
In the first phase, Cold War sites evolved directly
from wartime sites involved with research, develop-
ment, and production; air force and army bases were
also developed for continental defence and potential
offensive operations. By the middle phase the mili-
tary-industrial complex was in full production, lead-
ing to advances in continental defence (e.g. radar
systems), production, command and control centres,
and defence for the civilian population. It was also
during this period that the United States sought to
expand its international influence and military foot-
print. In the last phase Hanson identified a decrease
in defence construction in the continental
United States.
In the United Kingdom a slightly different chron-
ology has been proposed,39 again framed around sur-
viving infrastructure:
 First Cold War – 1946–1962
 Sustained balance/deterrence – 1963–1979
 Second Cold War – 1980–1989
During the immediate post war years, there was
very little new defence-related construction in the
UK, but the outbreak of the Korean War in June
1950 provoked fear that it might be a prelude to a
communist invasion of Western Europe. This led to a
massive rearmament programme and the construction
of associated infrastructure, including reconstructing
airfields to support the strategy of Mutually Assured
Destruction.40 During the 1960s and early 1970s
there was little new building work undertaken, as the
country’s nuclear deterrent passed to the Royal Navy.
Meanwhile the deployment of intercontinental mis-
siles in North America allowed many United States
strategic bomber squadrons to be reassigned away
from Europe. During the late 1960s NATO shifted its
war-fighting doctrine to Flexible Response, whereby
‘communism would be contained by a combination
of economic, political and military means, and any
attack would be met with a graduated response to
allow time for negotiations’.41 Finally, from the mid-
1970s in response to enhanced Soviet military capa-
bilities, there was a marked increase in western
defence expenditure, evident in the construction of
new emergency government headquarters and a
NATO Europe-wide ‘hardening programme’ to
reinforce key infrastructure.
Work to understand the chronology of Cold
War construction across the Soviet Union is in its
early stages and the following hypothesis is pro-
posed based around an understanding of sites
in Russia:
 Stasis with some dismantlement - 1946–1948
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 Modernisation of homeland defence systems
- 1948–1954
 Deployment of modern weapon systems -
1954–mid 1970s
 Modernisation of the missile forces - 1978–1985
 Reduction and freeze - 1985–1991
Prior to the 1990s in Soviet and Russian historiog-
raphy, the Cold War was interpreted solely as unilat-
eral ideological and political aggression of the West
against the USSR.42 It may be no surprise then that
expenditure on defence construction roughly mir-
rored that of the West.43
At the end of the Second World War the Soviet
armed forces were rapidly reduced, while enormous
resources were shifted toward nuclear weapons
research. The development of new technology, espe-
cially long-range aircraft and missiles, potentially
threatened the whole of the Soviet Union’s land
mass and to counter these challenges air defence
systems were built around Moscow and other major
cities along with facilities for air defence units,
command posts and radio-location stations.44 The
mid-1950s saw further reductions in the size of the
army with priority transferred to the transition to
nuclear weapons, missiles, and electronic control
systems, and the construction of missile silos and
command posts.45 From the late 1970s advances in
solid fuel technology for missiles and electronic
systems led to further changes in infrastructure. The
new missiles required less maintenance, and many
were mobile, requiring fewer personnel based on
smaller and less distinctive deployment sites.46 On
the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and
the easing of tensions with the West there was ini-
tially a reduction and ultimately a freeze on new
defence construction.
More work is required to refine Cold War con-
struction chronologies in other countries, and espe-
cially across the former Soviet Union. Certainly, as
the Soviet Union sought to meet the perceived threat
from NATO and to strengthen its influence in eastern
Europe represented by the founding of the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation or Warsaw Pact in 1956, there
was a marked drive to standardise equipment often
reflected in new infrastructure. In addition, much
wartime infrastructure was reused. In the German
Democratic Republic (GDR), for example, Soviet
forces occupied substantial wartime bunker com-
plexes which were adapted to meet Cold War threats
and serve new purposes. To the south of Berlin, for-
mer Wehrmacht Oberkommando des Heeres bunkers
were taken over as the main headquarters for the
Group of Soviet Forces Germany.47 It was not until
the mid-1960s that the East German government
began to construct purpose-built protected accommo-
dation and increasingly sophisticated facilities to
serve civil government and the armed forces over the
following decades.48
In summary, the chronology of architectural
development varies between countries (in this case,
the United States, England and Russia). There are
also obvious similarities as the countries responded
to one another’s perceived capabilities and the chang-
ing political landscape. Another key variable was the
rapid rate at which science and technology were
changing, partly driven by the need for military
superiority.
Science and Technology
Investigating the global Cold War through its military
installations and wider militarised landscape provides
a documentation that both aligns with and differs
from the grand political, historical narratives of the
period. An example is the re-use of earlier facilities,
which contradicts the myth of an entire Cold War
period characterised by new technologies and pro-
gress. At the end of the Second World War the
Soviet Union and the western allies controlled a vast
inheritance of defence research and manufacturing
facilities and military installations on their home ter-
ritories and those of their erstwhile allies and
defeated nations. Across this vast region, thousands
of military installations had been abandoned and, in
straitened post-war economies, existing sites were
reused and adapted to meet post-war needs.
Furthermore, in the early post-war years there were
huge surplus stocks of military equipment, and within
the western orbit American and British equipment
was widely used to re-equip the armies of the
recently liberated nations such as Belgium, the
Netherlands, Greece and Denmark. Across eastern
Europe it was more of a mixed picture. In
Czechoslovakia, for example, the manufacture of
German inspired armaments continued for some
time, whereas in the early 1950s the Soviet Union
began to supply East German forces with tanks and
artillery.49 Simply, and with the exception of jet air-
craft, if war had broken out again in the early 1950s
it would have been waged essentially with wartime
weaponry supported by contemporary infrastructure.
The Second World War also brought to the fore
technologies that would dominate the succeeding
decades, including atomic weapons, guided missiles,
jet engines and radar, requiring development of new
facilities for their manufacture, storage, maintenance
and deployment. For example, by 1950 the frontline
units of the major air forces were equipped with jet
aircraft, which in contrast to propeller driven aircraft,
tended to be heavier and had nose wheels, while the
fiery engine backwash soon burnt away grass air-
strips. To accommodate these new machines, con-
crete runways and associated taxiways were required,
along with maintenance facilities for their complex
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internal technologies thus driving significant changes
to aviation landscapes around the globe.
A notable characteristic of the Cold War was the
provision of military technology by the superpowers
to their allies, and the construction of semi-perman-
ent and permanent bases in their countries. These
included in the late 1950s the deployment by
America of Jupiter medium-range missiles in Italy
and Turkey, and Nike Hercules anti-aircraft missiles
additionally in Denmark, West Germany, Greece and
Norway. This supply and deployment of equipment
represented a complex web of patronage, defence and
commercial concerns. At the highest policy-levels,
the superpowers needed to ensure their allies were
effectively equipped and could operate alongside one
another. They did not, however, enjoy a monopoly of
arms sales, and countries such as the United
Kingdom remained leading developers and manufac-
turers of defence technology. For example, in the late
1950s the United Kingdom sold aircraft and air
defence missiles to western-leaning, although neutral,
Sweden and Switzerland, including the British
Bloodhound surface-to-air missile. The contemporary
Russian S75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) was one of the
most widely exported, and arguably successful, mis-
siles of the Cold War. It was responsible for bringing
down Gary Powers’ CIA U-2 spy plane over the
Soviet Union in May 1960 as well as many US air-
craft over Vietnam and was extensively used in mid-
dle-eastern conflicts. It was usually deployed in a
static air defence role and was launched from sites
with a distinctive star-shaped ground plan.50
One of the most distinctive features of the Cold
War was the deployment of nuclear weapons, collect-
ively representing a highly specialised landscape (or
‘taskscape’ in Ingold’s terms) with wide deployment
and even wider social, economic and political impact.
Nuclear research and production facilities were
largely restricted to the home territories of the
nuclear states; although the United States, United
Kingdom and France all made use of test ranges in
the South Pacific. The superpowers kept the oper-
ational deployment of nuclear weapons under tight
control. For instance, to implement the strategy of
Mutually Assured Destruction, which threatened
massive nuclear retaliation in response to an attack
on the United States or her allies, US Strategic Air
Command required new home bases in North
America and similar facilities in countries close to
eastern Europe, including in North Africa, Spain and
the United Kingdom. It was a comparable picture
with Soviet nuclear weapons during the 1950s and
early 1960s: by the late 1960s specialist stores had
been built in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and
Poland.51 An archaeological investigation in Cuba
uncovered a related set of structures, being the sites
prepared for Soviet missile deployment on the island
in October 1962, during what came to be known as
the Cuban Missile Crisis.52
This diversity of site types relating to military
activity throughout the Cold War provides an illustra-
tion of what Ingold53 describes as a taskscape, a
socially constructed space of human activity with
spatial boundaries and delimitations. Central is the
idea that taskscape, like landscape, is perpetually in
process rather than being in a static or otherwise
immutable state, a point that has particular relevance
in the fast-changing political and technological world
of the Cold War, notwithstanding its comparatively
short duration. Kuletz’s54 study of nuclear industries
of the American Midwest highlights the character
and wider impact of a complex and vast ‘taskscape’
in three specific but related contexts: the built infra-
structure (the ‘sites’, the places); the social landscape
of scientists and support staff that were essential to
their successful operation; and the environmental pol-
lution that resulted from the science undertaken, not-
ably from atomic testing. While not as openly
documented in the former Soviet Union, a compar-
able picture appears likely.55 Typically, these atomic
sites had complex histories of use and re-use after
abandonment. We can also identify a strong political
legacy (where armament and nuclear energy policies
and investments have a lasting environmental
impact), or political legacies to be, where these
impacts can be projected forward as ‘heritage
futures’, such as in the storage of nuclear waste.56
Finally, military strategy has always been shaped
by historical or contemporary events. The 1967
Arab-Israeli War provided a graphic illustration of
the vulnerability of aircraft parked on an open air-
field. Across the globe the lesson was quickly learnt
and from the early 1970s key NATO and Warsaw
Pact airfields took on a superficially similar appear-
ance with hardened aircraft shelters and other pro-
tected facilities (Figure 1). The western hardening of
its critical facilities was also a reflection of NATO’s
‘Flexible Response’ policy whereby it sought to pro-
tect enough of its strike forces to mount an immedi-
ate counter-attack against any would-be aggressor.
In summary, understanding the significance of
surviving Cold War sites can be improved by placing
them within a broader historical and geopolitical con-
text which requires thinking about the influences
exerted across political borders and the exchange of
information, for example through trade deals or espi-
onage. To date, heritage organisations have tended
only to view Cold War legacies within their
national context.
STAGE 3 - VALUES ASSESSMENT
Having completed Stages 1 and 2, the relative value
of individual sites can be assessed, based on a range
of indicative criteria. These criteria have been devel-
oped and previously published57 for sites in England,
influenced by a wider discussion of heritage values.58
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The criteria by which the significance of Cold War
sites was assessed appear as Table 3.
Most national heritage agencies and related organ-
isations have some mechanism for attributing cultural
values to archaeological sites, places and buildings.
Definitional criteria will be generic,59 while evalu-
ative criteria are more specific, recognising value or
significance as something associated with tightly-
defined variables including associations with specific
events, people or technological progress, or the qual-
ity of survival and rarity. This is broadly the mechan-
ism that exists within the United Kingdom and in
many other European countries: how one defines a
monument, and how one then assesses its
significance.
To take one of the criteria in Table 3 as an
example and building on the previous section, rarity
is generally known and easily quantifiable: that a site
or building may be one of fifty surviving of its type,
or one of ten, or the best surviving example, with
‘best’ often defined in terms of completeness or
integrity (see Table 3 for a range of considerations).
Further, this analysis may extend beyond the known
surviving population of sites to the known original
population. Thus, one of only five surviving exam-
ples may also be one of 500 originally built (the other
495 having been removed through a variety of cul-
tural and natural processes over the intervening
period). This work has been undertaken for numerous
categories of English Second World War and Cold
War sites, by Historic England60 under its former
Monuments Protection and Thematic Listing
Programmes.61 For this stage of the process, this
‘tried and tested’ methodology provides a compara-
tively straightforward and reliable basis for heritage
decision making.62
However, there are limitations to this ‘values
assessment’ process as it is currently applied. One is
that assessment is generally time limited: a generic
national assessment of surviving sites undertaken
once63 is soon out-of-date. A solution would be to
delay assessment until the point of need, although
this carries the risk that sites may be lost in the inter-
vening period. This ‘point of need’ assessment can
be easily and quickly achieved given that, with earlier
stages of the process complete, both context and site
locations will generally be known. A more serious
limitation is the national frameworks within which
these assessments are made. As an example, Historic
England recognises the Greenham Common airbase
and cruise missile site as having ‘national import-
ance’ but that hardly seems an adequate label for
such a place, given its position in a global network of
missile storage and launch sites, related Research and
Development establishments and defence systems.64
The site is one of six near identical ground-launched
cruise missile (GLCM) sites across Europe, which
themselves were part of a wider NATO response
alongside contemporary mobile US Pershing II mis-
siles with storage sites in former West Germany. All
of these sites faced east. In the former Soviet Union
and her allied states many opposing sites for equiva-
lent SS 20 missiles existed, facing west.65 These are
all sites whose significance is mutually dependent
(Figure 2). A transnational approach would argue
that it is the ‘group value’ of all of these sites that
contributes most to the cultural value of each of the
individual sites. It would also provide important rec-
ognition of the role of individual sites as part of a
wider network.
STAGE 4 - DECISION-MAKING
Heritage is always political, and draws its priorities
from particular viewpoints and perspectives, to deter-
mine for example what is worth preserving, why and
for whom. Politics also contributes to prioritisation
and heritage funding. All of this will vary between
countries influencing how heritage and specific
FIG. 1
A hardened aircraft shelter from (left) Alconbury, Cambridgeshire (England), and (right) a Soviet example from
Altenburg (Germany).#Wayne Cocroft.
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heritage sites are managed. Attitudes towards expert-
ise also vary between countries, ranging from conser-
vative approaches that advocate central control to
more liberal approaches involving community leader-
ship, even community ownership of heritage assets,
such as Bunker 42 at Taganka (Moscow) which, as
we saw earlier, is under private management. Where
the subject of attention is itself highly politicized and
recent, these issues may come into even
sharper focus.
Within this context it is worth noting the potential
benefits of policy guidelines and frameworks such as
the Faro Convention,66 which originated in the cre-
ation of new states (and thus the rebuilding of
national identities and heritage) following the end of
the Cold War. With the Faro Convention, the breadth
of cultural heritage, its relevance to society and iden-
tity and the recognition of heritage communities are
central, alongside the Convention’s direct alignment
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet
even with Faro (a Convention to which many of the
countries mentioned in this paper are signatories),
reaching consensus on the significance of sites which
represent such marked political and philosophical
FIG. 2
(Left) A ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) site at Greenham Common, West Berkshire (England, photograph
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic license), and (right) a former Soviet mis-
sile store at Altengrabow, Saxony-Anhalt, Germany (2001).#W D Cocroft
TABLE 3
Assessment Criteria used to assess Cold War sites in England
Survival/condition
 Structural integrity and survival of internal configuration, plant and fittings.
 Structures that survive in their original form; however, reuse for another purpose may add historical
value to a structure.
 Survival of contemporary setting, character, spatial relationships – group value.
Period
 A site that represents a particular phase of the Cold War.
 Centrality to a country’s or alliance’s defence doctrine or policy.
 Technological significance.
Rarity
 In most cases individual site types are rare. Criteria for protection will probably also include
technological reasons.
Diversity of form
 Where a site or structural type might exhibit a number of different structural forms, although designed
to fulfil an identical or similar function.
Cultural and amenity value
 Sites or structures that promote public education, access, and tourism.
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divisions will not always be easy to assess, meaning
that decisions about their future will often
be contested.
In Russia, the material legacy of the Cold War
remains neglected. Several factors play into this. First
is the common notion (understood by Russian citi-
zens) that the Soviet Union ‘lost’ the Cold War, since
its major result was the collapse of the Union.
President Putin made a well-known statement to this
effect, when he said that: ‘the collapse of the Soviet
Union was the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the
century’.67 Thus, officially, Russian attitudes towards
the Cold War are restrained, in contrast to the official
and national pride about the Great Victory in the
Great Patriotic War. These are attitudes which frame
the beliefs of the majority of Russian citizens.
Unofficially however, attitudes are contested. Some
consider the ending of the Cold War positive, since it
opened a pathway to democracy and Western values;
while others, presumably influenced by Putin, view
the ending of the Cold War as resulting from the
betrayal of socialist values by past presidents
Gorbachev and Yeltsin.68 Related to this is the con-
cept of ostalgie, a nostalgia felt amongst citizens of
the former East Germany for the communist era,
played out in the 2003 tragicomedy, Good Bye
Lenin!, one of many films which provide alternative
perspectives on the ending of the Eastern
Cold War.69
In spite of these differences of opinion and eco-
nomic and political pressures, and as mentioned pre-
viously, some military sites are preserved across the
former Soviet Union’s allied states, in Poland at
Podborsko, Kolobrzeg and Swinoujscie, the Baltic
States, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, the former
Yugoslavia, the former German Democratic Republic
and Lithuania (see Figure 3).70 In the former GDR,
artist Angus Boulton has documented former Soviet
barracks sites in their abandoned state, recalling their
complex military and social histories on film, often
creating a unique record of the murals and graffiti
that typically remain. At Forst Zinna, for example, a
departing soldier wrote his last goodbye on his bar-
rack room wall, as the Cold War created the site’s
final abandonment: ‘Cood bay [Goodbye]
Forst Zinna’.71
Many sites survive in the west, across the full
typological range. Early sight of post-Cold War dis-
posal lists by the United Kingdom’s Defence Estate
organisation, for example, allowed English Heritage
to conduct the research described earlier in this paper
often in advance of disposals, and culminating in
publications72 which encouraged wider sectoral
involvement in documentation and survey, as well as
promoting public understanding. Early action and
clear decisions on significance (occasionally but not
necessarily resulting in designations) meant that heri-
tage implications were already known to potential
developers when sites were bought.
Recent measures taken by the Russian
Federation’s Ministry of Defence show that it has an
understanding of the importance of protecting mili-
tary heritage and of its significant role in the public’s
patriotic upbringing. In July 2016 it opened the
Military Patriotic Park of Culture and Recreation
near Moscow, with exhibitions of Soviet and Russian
aviation, rocket and aerospace devices and equip-
ment, and armoured and special vehicles. The Park
also includes diverse structures, such as the Central
Museum of Armored Weapons and Equipment, the
Guerrilla-warriors village (an imitation of a Second
World War partisan-guerrillas’ camp), the Center for
Military-Tactical Games, and a field for historical re-
enactments. From its website, the official mission of
‘Patriot Park’ is to contribute to education, to create
an attractive and friendly image of the Armed Forces,
and to help develop a sense of pride and respect for
the Motherland. The Park combines education with
amusement. Shortly after opening, it became a popu-
lar place, receiving hundreds of daily visits.73 This
extends beyond collecting objects to developing sites
that place objects within their historical cul-
tural landscape.
In summary, management options will depend on
a complex range of locally-defined circumstances,
only some of which are discussed in this paper.
Sometimes sites will be demolished to make way for
new development, while many abandoned Cold War
installations form what planners often refer to as
‘brownfield’ sites, ripe for redevelopment.74 In other
situations sites and landscape are simply left alone,
abandoned, to ‘curated decay’.75 Unlike the other
three stages of the transnational approach, it seems
both necessary if not appropriate that these decisions
are taken locally based on locally-held perspectives.
That said, consensus will be hard to establish. One
example is the Nevada Test Site where the remote
desert location makes any clear-up of a vast material
record of nuclear testing costly, dangerous and (for
some) unnecessary. Yet these are traditional lands of
the Western Shoshone, to which they are currently
denied access. The disadvantage of curated decay in
this case is environmental pollution76 while the bene-
fit for researchers is arguably an unprecedented and
virtually limitless research opportunity:77 a major and
significant archaeological legacy survives across the
Test Site, providing resources for a unique documen-
tation that can either complement or contradict offi-
cial and archival accounts, should they ever come to
light. Another example is the Teufelsberg in Berlin, a
Cold War listening station where signals emitted
from the East were intercepted and interpreted in the
West. This site is also now abandoned and in a state
of decay (see Figure 4).78 Again, this site has pro-
vided research opportunity,79 while its ruined and
heavily graffitied state is a bone of contention
amongst former veterans and the alternative
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communities which now occupy and use the site as a
gallery and performance space.
CONCLUSION: THE TRANSNATIONAL
COLD WAR LANDSCAPE
We conclude this paper with the suggestion that a
transnational approach provides a helpfully fluid
framework for managing Cold War heritage infra-
structure across the globe. On one level Cold War
landscapes are inevitably either ‘East’ or ‘West’ and
in terms of the human experience this division is
appropriate: people and politics were one or the
other, with an ‘iron curtain’ in between. But in terms
of intellectual enquiry, one can also helpfully investi-
gate landscape as ‘East’ and ‘West’, as
McWilliams80 has done for the Soviet border, for
example, and Klausmeier and Schmidt81 have
achieved for the Berlin Wall. This paper is an attempt
to extend our view outwards from these discrete sites,
places and things, to the entirety of the Cold War
experience. We have presented a new perspective on
the Cold War, and a new lens through which to view
a surprisingly unfamiliar past. Part of what we see
through that lens is the need for theoretical perspec-
tive, such as through ideas reminiscent of a task-
scape,82 and recognition of the Cold War as a largely
technological conflict, with each ‘side’ trying to neg-
ate the other through science and technological pro-
gress. The ‘space race’ is the ultimate example of
this, and one that helpfully extends conceptions of
landscape to the earth’s orbit, and indeed space.83
But to achieve the goals we have set out requires
some reappraisal of the data, and of the way we view
it. Previously, too much emphasis has been placed on
creating national inventories, telling individual stories
of the Cold War and examining significance in terms
of the nations that participated in it. Where tourism
initiatives have looked beyond national borders to
develop transnational heritage ‘trails’, exemplified by
work around the Baltic where a guidebook describes
Cold War sites to visit across the region,84 visitors
are better informed of the wider landscape. The cre-
ation of such trails, and the research that informs
them, provides an example of how one can achieve
new popular and transnational public understandings.
The same is true of heritage assessment and manage-
ment, for which a common approach requires a
FIG. 3
DUGA Radar Array near Chernobyl (Ukraine). This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
Unported license. Image: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DUGA_Radar_Array_near_Chernobyl,_
Ukraine_2014.jpg
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common framework, or at least a suite of related
approaches to the sites that remain.
Of the many types of heritage that exist, Cold War
heritage is amongst the most challenging, being close
in memory and ubiquitous (even if many of the sites
have been re-used and pass barely recognisable as
formerly having military purpose). It presents chal-
lenges as a heritage of division, competition and ideo-
logical difference. And because it remains etched into
cultural memory, it continues to have relevance. Yet,
FIG 4
The Teufelsberg, Berlin. A Cold War listening station recently afforded heritage protection. The site is well known,
much visited and used by a diversity of communities. Photograph: John Schofield.
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while the Cold War may feel important now, we
should be wary of predicting its significance in the
future and the tendency to always default to a strategy
of protecting sites ‘for the benefit of future genera-
tions’. Eric Hobsbawm,85 for example, argued that
the military aspects of the Cold War are secondary;
that the, ‘extraordinary, unprecedented, fundamental
changes which the world economy, and consequently
human societies, had undergone in the period since
the Cold War began … will, or should, have a far
larger place in the history books of the third millen-
nium than the Korean War, the Berlin and Cuba cri-
ses, and the cruise missiles.’ Further, Cold War
historian John Lewis Gaddis cautions that humility is
needed when assessing the Cold War’s significance;
what might seem momentous to current generations,
might in the distant future be regarded as trivial and
insignificant.86
Whatever we think about this particular ‘heritage
future’, we argue here that having a transnational
approach to this contemporary heritage of the Cold
War seems a sensible and attainable aspiration and
will be helpful in providing a solid foundation for
decision making. By working together across former
political divisions, the transnational approach also
provides the opportunity to pool knowledge and
resources in a spirit of cooperation and friendship.
This paper has provided a framework against which
such an approach can be achieved.
NOTES
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, an
intergovernmental military alliance of 29 North
American and European countries. The organization
implements the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed
on 4 April 1949.
2 The Warsaw Pact was a collective defence treaty
between the old Soviet Union and seven other Eastern
Bloc socialist republics of Central and Eastern Europe
in May 1955.
3 Commonly considered to cover the years 1946 to
1989, after Cocroft & Thomas 2003; although in some
areas of the world the dates can vary, arguably up to
the present in some places.
4 e.g. the use of former Cold War buildings in
Berlin as nightclubs, discussed in Schofield &
Rellensman 2015.
5 Cocroft & Thomas 2003.
6 Hannerz 1996, 1997.
7 Willems 2014.
8 Bradshaw, E. et al. 2011, and cited in
Willems 2014.
9 Willems 2014, 114.
10 Ingold 1993.
11 after Glaser & Strauss 1967.
12 Baker 1993; Klausmeier & Schmidt 2004.
13 McWilliams 2013.
14 Borneman 1992.
15 Johnson 2002, 234.
16 Harahan 1993.
17 see also Price 2005 for the use of this phrase.
18 Virilio 1994.
19 Examples include the Museum of Military Cargo
Aviation (Ivanovo, opened in 1984), Museum of the
Air Force of the Northern Fleet (Murmansk district,
opened in 1976), and the Museum of the Air Defense
Forces (Moscow district, opened in 1978).
20 Rasmussen 2010.
21 Rasmussen 2010, 134-5.
22 Cocroft & Thomas 2003.
23 Cocroft 2007.
24 Stenak et al. 2013.
25 for Italy see Bravaglieri 2019; for Albania, e.g.
Glass 2018.
26 Ongyerth, 2007.
27 Hoppe et al. 2014.
28 Klausmeier & Schmidt 2004.
29 Bures 2013; Rak et al. 2018.
30 for an overview, see Hanson 2016. Also the so-
called ‘science cities’ in the American Midwest, after
Kuletz 1998.
31 e.g. Granatstein 2011 and Mushynsky 2019.
32 Burstrom et al. 2011, 14; Cocroft & Thomas
2003, 38-46.
33 Cocroft & Thomas 2003, 76-81.
34 Pretty 1981, 478-484.
35 Harahan 1993, 120 and 122.
36 Schofield & Anderton 2000; Marshall et al. 2009.
37 Beck et al. 2009.
38 Hanson 2016, 28-67.
39 Cocroft 2007.
40 or ‘MAD’, the idea that as long as parity was
maintained, neither side would risk a pre-emptive strike.
41 Cocroft & Thomas 2003, 9.
42 Egorova 2017, 17.
43 after Chernoff 1991.
44 e.g. Fowler 2008; Collective authors 1968.
45 Bystrov 2004.
46 Podvig 1998.
47 Best 2003 181-7.
48 Best 2003, 15.
49 Kopenhagen 1999, 13-19.
50 Isby 1981, 245-52.
51 Eckart 2013, 3.
52 Burstrom et al. 2009; Burstrom et al. 2011.
53 Ingold 1993.
54 Kuletz 1998.
55 an example is Robert Maxwell’s research at
Chernobyl - https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/
04/20160428-Chernobyl-Pripyat-archaeology-abandoned-
ruins-nuclear-disaster-Pompeii-Ukraine/ - accessed 8
January 2019.
56 Holtorf & Hogberg 2016.
57 e.g. Cocroft 2007.
58 Most notably Lipe 1984, de la Torre 2002, and
most recently English Heritage 2008.
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59 for example, how the term ‘monument’ is legally
defined, or that everything beyond a certain age has
value or protection by default, and that ‘younger’ sites
(less than 100 years old, say) do not.
60 previously English Heritage.
61 e.g. Schofield 2000; Schofield 2001.
62 see also Stenak et al. 2013, for a comparable
example from Denmark.
63 like England’s Monuments Protection Programme,
1988-circa 2005.
64 not to mention the history of protest at the site,
and the significant traces of this which remain.
65 Harahan 1993, 120, 122.
66 Council of Europe 2009.
67 Message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian
Federation 25.04.2005. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/
transcripts/22931 [accessed 9 August 2018].
68 cf. “Who actually won the Cold War?” in the
newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, 01.02.2012.
69 Steingrover 2007.
70 See for example Rasmussen 2010; Klupsz 2018;
http://zimnawojna.info/ - accessed 9 August 2018.
71 Boulton 2007.
72 e.g. Cocroft & Thomas 2003.
73 http://patriotp.ru/about/general-information/.
74 see Lange and McNeil 2004 for a wider discussion.
75 after DeSilvey 2017.
76 Kuletz 1998.
77 Beck 2002.
78 Cocroft & Schofield 2016; 2019
79 Cocroft & Schofield 2019.
80 McWilliams 2013.
81 Klausmeier & Schmidt 2004.
82 after Ingold 1993.
83 Gorman & O’Leary 2007.
84 Rasmussen 2010.
85 Hobsbawm 1994, 256.
86 Gaddis 2007, 260.
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SUMMARY IN FRENCH, GERMAN, ITALIAN AND SPANISH
RESUME
Guerre Froide: une approche transnationale
d’un patrimoine mondial conteste
Les divers et varies monuments et sites militaires
de la Guerre Froide constituent une trace arch-
eologique complexe que de nombreux pays con-
siderent desormais comme faisant partie de leur
patrimoine. En developpant des moyens pour mieux
comprendre et gerer ce patrimoine de la Guerre
Froide, l’accent a ete mis sur : la creation d’inven-
taires nationaux de sites et monuments qui racon-
tent des histoires specifiques de la Guerre Froide ;
l’examen de l’importance du contexte sur les
nations individuelles qui y ont participe ; et la
selection de quelques sites particuliers pour leur
conservation. Apres avoir expose quelques exem-
ples de ces initiatives variees, cet article presente
une nouvelle approche ‘transnationale’ pour
l’amelioration de la comprehension et la gestion
des sites patrimoniaux de la Guerre Froide ou
qu’ils se situent. La methodologie encourage la
cooperation au-dela d’anciennes frontieres et pour
la premiere fois, entre l’Est et l’Ouest. Avec des
focus sur la comparaison directe entre l’Angleterre
et la Russie, en se referant a d’autres sites toujours
en place au sein de l’ancien Pacte de Varsovie et
des regions de l’OTAN, ainsi que les Etats-Unis,
nous considerons que cette approche en 4 etapes
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permet d’ameliorer notre comprehension d’un
inventaire archeologique complexe et d’apporter de
nouvelles perspectives sur la signification, se fai-
sant, (en depit de la periode d’instabilite
geopolitique) dans un esprit de cooperation et
d’amitie.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Der Kalte Krieg: Ein transnationaler Ansatz f€ur
ein globales Erbe
Obwohl es einen Teil der lebendigen Erinnerungen
darstellt, betrachten viele L€ander ihre Architektur
des Kalten Krieges heute als Teil ihres Kulturerbes.
F€ur Kulturerbeverwalter k€onnen diese Geb€aude
sogar eine Priorit€at darstellen, da bedeutende
Geb€aude h€aufig zur Wiederverwendung geeignet
sind, w€ahrend ausgedehnte ,,Industriebrachen“ wie
Flugpl€atze f€ur eine umfassende Sanierung genutzt
werden k€onnen. In einer Reihe von L€andern, auf
deren Arbeit wir uns hier beziehen (insbesondere
im Vereinigten K€onigreich und anderswo in
Europa), sind Institutionen, die f€ur die Verwaltung
des Kulturerbes ihres Landes verantwortlich sind,
diese Aufgabe angegangen, indem sie nationale
Inventare von Standorten und Geb€auden erstellt
haben. Dies geschah, um wissenschaftlich fundierte
Entscheidungen €uber die Nutzung treffen zu
k€onnen. Der folgende Artikel stellt die These auf,
dass die Breite und der internationale Kontext des
Kalten Krieges einen angemesseneren (oder zus€at-
zlichen, €ubergeordneten) Rahmen f€ur eine solche
Entscheidungsfindung bietet, in dem man ihn
Transnational betrachtet. Ein solcher ,,trans-
nationaler“ Ansatz w€urde den Vergleich €ahnlicher
(z. B. europ€aischer) Strukturen nicht nur innerhalb
der nationalen Grenzen, sondern €uber den gesamten
Umfang ihres Auftretens innerhalb der westlichen
NATO1 in Europa und Nordamerika erm€oglichen.
Durch diesen Ansatz k€onnte man auch einen
Vergleich mit €ahnlichen Standorten in L€andern
erm€oglichen, die Teil des Warschauer Pakts im
Ostblock waren2. Nachdem einige Beispiele daf€ur
skizziert wurden, wie nationale Institutionen mit
ihrem jeweiligen Erbe des Kalten Krieges umge-
gangen sind, werden in diesem Artikel die vier
Stufen eines transnationalen Ansatzes vorgestellt,
die – landesunabh€angig und l€ander€ubergreifend –
ein besseres Verst€andnis und Management der
Kulturerbest€atten des Kalten Krieges erm€oglichen.
Mit einem besonderen Schwerpunkt auf dem dir-
ekten Vergleich zwischen England und Russland
und inklusive der Strukturen, die an anderer Stelle
in den Regionen der ehemaligen NATO und des
Warschauer Pakts sowie in den Vereinigten Staaten
vorhanden sind, argumentieren wir, dass dieser
vierstufige Ansatz: a) ein neues Verst€andnis der
komplexen arch€aologischen und architektonischen
Hinterlassenschaften liefert; b) neue Perspektiven
auf ihre Bedeutung erm€oglicht; und c) (vor allem
in der heutigen Zeit von geopolitischer Instabilit€at)
die Zusammenarbeit und Freundschaft zwischen
verschiedenen L€andern f€ordern kann.
RIASSUNTO
La guerra fredda: un approccio sovrannazionale
a un patrimonio globale conteso
La guerra fredda e un periodo storico al quale sono
ascrivibili piu siti militari di diversa tipologia, ed
edifici che costituiscono una complessa testimo-
nianza archeologica, considerata adesso da diversi
paesi come parte del loro patrimonio. Nel portare
avanti delle strategie per gestire e meglio compren-
dere tale patrimonio, allo stato dell'arte e stata
posta particolare attenzione sui seguenti aspetti:
creare degli inventari nazionali dei siti e degli edi-
fici che attestano storie specifiche della guerra
fredda; analizzare la loro rilevanza in seno alle sin-
gole nazioni che vi presero parte; selezione alcuni
siti specifici da tutelare. Dopo aver messo in evi-
denza alcuni esempi fra queste variegate iniziative,
questo contributo presenta un nuovo approccio sov-
rannazionale in quattro fasi, che si propone di
migliorare la comprensione e la gestione dei luoghi
legati alla guerra fredda, indipendentemente da
dove siano situati. Questa metodologia incoraggia
la collaborazione attraverso confini ora scomparsi,
specificamente quelli fra l'Est e l'Ovest.
Focalizzandoci in parte sul confronto tra
l'Inghilterra e la Russia, e facendo riferimento ai
siti preservati nelle aree di influenza legate sia al
patto di Varsavia e alla NATO, sia agli Stati Uniti,
sosteniamo che questo approccio in quattro fasi for-
nisce una rinnovata comprensione di dati archeolo-
gici complessi, dando nuove prospettive sul loro
significato. Inoltre, cosa significativa in un
momento di instabilita geopolitica, tutto cio viene
portato avanti in uno spirito di collaborazione e di
amicizia.
RESUMEN
Guerra Frıa: un enfoque transnacional de un
patrimonio mundial
La arquitectura de la Guerra Frıa es considerada
por muchos paıses como parte esencial de su here-
ncia. A veces es incluso considerada como una pri-
oridad en la gestion de patrimonio ya que los
edificios importantes pueden ser reutilizados, mien-
tras que los lugares vacıos extensos, como por
ejemplo los aerodromos, se pueden urbanizar. En
varios paıses a cuyo trabajo nos referimos aquı (en
particular el Reino Unido y otras partes de
Europa), las agencias responsables de la gestion del
patrimonio han creado inventarios nacionales de
yacimientos y edificios con el fin de tomar deci-
siones informadas sobre su futuro. Este artıculo
propone que el marco mas apropiado para la toma
dichas decisiones serıa un contexto internacional
mas amplio. El enfoque "transnacional" permitirıa
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la comparacion de yacimientos similares (por ejem-
plo europeos) en toda la extension del despliegue
occidental de la OTAN en Europa y en America
del Norte. Tambien permitirıa la comparacion de
yacimientos en paıses que formaron parte del Pacto
de Varsovia del bloque oriental. Despues de esbo-
zar algunos ejemplos de como las agencias nacio-
nales han abordado su herencia de la Guerra Frıa,
presentamos las cuatro etapas de este enfoque
transnacional que preve una mejor comprension y
gestion del patrimonio de la Guerra Frıa donde-
quiera que se encuentren. Con un enfoque
especıfico en la comparacion directa entre
Inglaterra y Rusia, y tambien refiriendonos a los
yacimientos que sobreviven en otros lugares dentro
de las antiguas regiones de la OTAN y del Pacto
de Varsovia, ası como en los Estados Unidos, argu-
mentamos que este enfoque de cuatro etapas: pro-
porciona una nueva comprension de un registro
arqueologico y arquitectonico complejo; brinda
nuevas perspectivas sobre la importancia de tales
yacimientos; y (sobre todo en una epoca de inesta-
bilidad geopolıtica) lo hace con un espıritu de
cooperacion y amistad.
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